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I. INTRODUCTION  
¶1 Many working married women are unfairly burdened by the implicit gender bias in 
the United States Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  According to Professor Edward 
McCaffery, the best financial advice for women today is “Don’t marry.  Don’t have kids.  
Don’t work.”1  How married women are taxed undoubtedly affects their decisions to 
work after getting married, to have children, and to continue working after having 
children.  Married women face these questions primarily because of the secondary earner 
bias—a bias that emerges in the tax rules that govern married couples.  Due to this bias, 
some married working women, as secondary earners,2 are subject to high marginal 
income taxes because of the way their income is treated when filing jointly with their 
husbands.  In fact, the average working married woman loses over two-thirds of her pay 
to income taxes.3   
¶2 However, many other countries around the world do not tax secondary earners at 
such surprisingly high rates.  For example, in the last two decades, Malaysia, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland have implemented extensive tax reforms concerning the treatment 
of working married women.  This Comment undertakes an international and comparative 
analysis of how these foreign tax systems treat working married women.  Through 
analyzing these tax reforms and highlighting their most progressive measures, this 
Comment shows that the secondary earner bias within the U.S. tax code produces a 
discriminatory effect in need of correction.   
¶3 In Part II, this Comment commences with an examination of the history and 
implementation of the married filing jointly designation in the United States that led to 
                                                 
∗ Juris Doctor, 2009, Northwestern University School of Law; MPA University of Texas at Austin; B.A. 
Dillard University.  I especially would like to thank Professor Stephanie Hoffer for her endless assistance 
with this Comment, Professor Nancy Staudt for her time, instruction, and patience, and the editorial staff 
members of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their superb editing.   
1 EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN: HOW THE MARRIAGE PENALTY AFFECTS YOUR TAXES 29–57 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1997) (1999) (McCaffery offers this advice in a joking manner but with the intent 
of showing how women are greatly affected by the tax code); see also Kim Tso, Work, Motherhood and 
Taxes, MOTHERSANDMORE.ORG, Mar./Apr. 2004, http://www.mothersandmore.org/Forum/Tso-
TaxingMothersFORUM.pdf.  
2 Women are customarily deemed secondary earners because they earn less than their husbands.  
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21.  Additionally, often the lower earner is the least committed to the 
workforce (e.g., because of leaving the workforce to have children) and thus can be viewed as the 
secondary earner.  See generally Kristin Maschka, Tax Law Pushes ‘Secondary Earners’ to Drop Out, 
WOMEN’S ENEWS, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2703. 
3 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21.   
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the creation of the secondary earner bias.  It includes an analysis of the common instances 
of this bias in the IRC and the insufficiency of prior amendments by Congress to 
eliminate its effects on married couples.  This Comment shows that the legislative 
attempts to alleviate this secondary earner bias have not been sufficient, and hence, we 
should look outside the United States for solutions, specifically to Malaysia, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland.  Part III surveys the history of the treatment of working married 
women in the tax systems of Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland and then 
considers the tax reforms responsible for the more favorable treatment that working 
married women receive in these countries.  In Part IV, this Comment proposes that the 
United States incorporate the tax reforms of Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland 
into the IRC.  This proposal includes a separate assessment filing designation for married 
couples whereby married women have the option of filing separately from their husbands 
and being taxed according to the IRC’s joint filing tax rates with applicable transferable 
credits between the spouses.   
II. HISTORY OF THE TAXATION OF MARRIED WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES  
¶4 The IRC currently offers five different filing options:4 single, married filing jointly, 
married filing separately, head of household, and qualifying widower with a dependent 
child.5  While the specific tax rates associated with each filing status differ, all are 
progressive; in other words, a taxpayer’s marginal rate increases with her income.6  Aside 
                                                 
4 See I.R.C. § 1 (2008).   
5 Included is a table briefly explaining the different filing status options.  For further explanation, see I.R.S., 
EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION, I.R.S. Pub. No. 501, at 6 (Dec. 11, 2008), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf.  
 
Filing Status Qualifications 
Single On the last day of the tax year, taxpayer is not 
married or legally separated from spouse and do 
not qualify for another filing status. 
Married Filing Jointly On the last day of the tax year, couple is legally 
married and chooses to file jointly.   
Married Filing Separately  Couple is legally married and chooses to file 
separately.  
Head of Household Taxpayer is not married and paid for cost of 
maintaining a home for himself and a 
relative/dependent, who lived with him for over 
half of the year.  
Qualifying Widower with dependent child  Surviving spouse of deceased spouse that died 
within the last two taxable years and surviving 
spouse maintained the principal home for 
qualifying dependents and has not remarried.  
 
6 The table below portrays the 2009 progressive tax rate schedules for each filing status.  Note that married 
filing jointly and qualifying widower with dependent child share the same schedule.  See I.R.C. §1(d), 
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from a few minor exceptions, married couples must choose either to file jointly or 
separately.7  Due to a series of special rules associated with tax credits and exemptions, 
married couples who file jointly are likely to incur a lower tax burden than similarly 
situated couples filing two separate returns under the “married filing separately” option.8  
For this reason, 96& of married couples file one joint return.9  Accordingly, to understand 
                                                                                                                                                 
Filing Status Tax Rate Schedule 
Single  10% on the income between $0 and $8350  
15% on the income between $8350 and $33,950; 
plus $835  
25% on the income between $33,950 and $82,250; 
plus $4,675  
28% on the income between $82,250 and 
$171,550; plus $16,750  
33% on the income between $171,550 and 
$372,950; plus $41,754  
35% on the income over $372,950; plus $108,216 
Married Filing Jointly or Qualifying Widower 
with dependent child 
10% on the income between $0 and $16,700  
15% on the income between $16,700 and $67,900; 
plus $1,670  
25% on the income between $67,900 and 
$137,050; plus $9,350  
28% on the income between $137,050 and 
$208,850; plus $26,637.50  
33% on the income between $208,850 and 
$372,950; plus $46,741.50  
35% on the income over $372,950; plus 
$100,894.50
Married Filing Separately  10% on the income between $0 and $8350  
15% on the income between $8350 and $33,950; 
plus $835  
25% on the income between $33,950 and $68,525; 
plus $4,675  
28% on the income between $68,525 and 
$104,425; plus $13,318.75  
33% on the income between $104,425 and 
$186,475; plus $23,370.75  
35% on the income over $186,475; plus 
$50,447.25 
Head of Household 10% on the income between $0 and $11,950 
15% on the income between $11,950 and $45,500; 
plus $1,195  
25% on the income between $45,500 and 
$117,450; plus $6,227.50  
28% on the income between $117,450 and 
$190,200; plus $24,215  
33% on the income between $190,200 and 
$372,950; plus $44,585  
35% on the income over $372,950; plus 
$104,892.50 
 
7 I.R.S. Pub. No. 501, supra note 5, at 6.   
8 Id. at 6–7. 
9 I.R.S., SOURCES OF INCOME TAX STATISTICS - INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, I.R.S. Pub. No. 1304, 
at tbl.1.2 (All Returns: Adjusted Gross Income, Exemptions, Deductions, and Tax Items), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=134951,00.html.  See also infra notes 72–74.   
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the effects of the current tax rules on married women, this Comment focuses primarily on 
those who select the “married filing jointly” option and only briefly notes the tax 
consequences of couples who choose to file separately.    
¶5 Before examining the discriminatory effects on the secondary earner under joint 
filing, it is crucial to first analyze the legislative history of the married filing jointly 
designation in order to understand where the discriminatory effects on working married 
women as secondary earners originate.  Discussion of the legislative history will show 
that Congress influenced married couples to file jointly to appease both the economic 
conditions and social norms of the time. 
A. From Independent to Joint Filing 
¶6 The federal government obtained the power to impose an income tax with the 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.10  Initially, regardless of marital status, 
all taxpayers were taxed as individuals.  In the words of Boris Bittker, “[t]ax legislation 
enacted by Congress was dominated by an individualistic approach at the outset.”11  
Between 1913 and 1948, an identical tax rate schedule governed both married and single 
individuals.12  Following the social norms at the time, most husbands worked while their 
wives remained in the home.13  As such, the husband’s income was customarily the only 
income.  
¶7 Because of individualized taxation, married couples, primarily wealthy ones,14 
explored avenues to reduce their tax liability.  One popular method was income 
splitting,15 or the dividing of income between each spouse.  To understand why this 
approach was economically rational, reconsider the progressive tax rates.  Unlike a 
system of flat taxes, which imposes a single rate on every dollar earned, a progressive tax 
system imposes a higher marginal tax rate on higher levels of income.  This means that 
the first dollars of income are subject to the lowest rates, but as income goes up, so do the 
rates.  In the 1930s, for example, Congress imposed a 0% rate on income between $0 and 
$20,000, but a 40% rate on income over $70,000.16  Couples desired to shift income 
between one another to avail themselves of the tax code’s lower rates and thereby 
decrease their overall tax burden.  
¶8 These tax avoidance schemes were, of course, challenged in federal court.  In 1930, 
the Supreme Court decided two landmark cases addressing the issue.  In Lucas v. Earl,17 
the Court held that a husband could not shift his earned income to his wife in a common 
                                                 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
11 Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1400 (1975).   
12 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 16, 30–32.  See also Bittker, supra note 11. 
13 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 31, 33 (“In 1939, somewhere between 80% and 90% of all income taxes 
were paid by men or male-dominated households” and “[a]s late as 1940, only 12–15% of wives appeared 
to be working outside of the home at all, and less than 10% of married mothers worked . . . . A 1936 Gallup 
poll revealed that 82% of all respondents and even 75% of the females polled, thought that a woman with 
an employed husband should not work outside the home.”).  
14 Id. at 47–48 (“Income splitting was still largely a rich family’s issue in the 1940’s, even after the 
expansion of the income tax during World War II.”).  
15 Id.   
16 Id. at 31 tbl.5.    
17 281 U.S. 111, 113–15 (1930).   
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law separate property jurisdiction.18  The Court, however, modified the scope of this rule 
in Poe v. Seaborn,19 which held that in a community property state,20 shifting was 
justified given that half the husband’s earned income belonged to the wife under state 
law.21   However, according to McCaffery, the Supreme Court allowed income splitting 
in community property states, not under the notion of equality for married women, but 
rather to validate the authority of the husband.22  Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, 
stated, “[public] policy dictates that third parties who deal with the husband respecting 
community property shall be assured that the wife shall not be permitted to nullify his 
transactions.”23 
¶9 After Poe, while many states retained their preexisting laws,24 a number of 
common law states enacted statutes allowing couples to shift income and marital 
property, influencing “husbands in separate property states [to] attempt self-help income 
splitting, through both gifts of property and by making their wives business partners.”25  
This led to asymmetrical tax treatment of economically identical couples across the 
nation and confusion in the courts.26  Accordingly, Congress reacted.27   
¶10 In 1948, Congress created joint filing for married couples.28  Instead of the 
individual filing system, married couples could now file joint returns and be treated as a 
                                                 
18 In a separate property state, income and property acquired by each spouse during the marriage is treated 
as separately owned by each spouse.  See Bittker, supra note 11, at 1400. 
19 282 U.S. 101, 101–16 (1930).  Note that in this case the IRS’s argument was that regardless of the type 
of state the couple resided in, community property or separate property, and regardless if the wife acquired 
the property on her own, the husband controlled the property.  Thus, the husband cannot shift his income or 
property to his wife.  See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 40–42.   
20 In a community property state, each spouse is entitled to half of the other spouse’s income and property 
acquired during the marriage.  Bittker provides a detailed analysis of the differences between a community 
property state and a common law separate jurisdiction state.  Bittker also discusses how married women 
were treated in each state during this time.  See Bittker, supra note 11, at 1400. 
21 Poe, 282 U.S. at 101–16.  The Supreme Court applied the rationale that a husband could not shift income 
or property to his wife to decrease his tax liability in a separate property state in Hoeper v. Tax 
Commission.  284 U.S. 206, 215 (1931) (“[A]ny attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's 
property or income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
22 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 41–42.   
23 Poe, 282 U.S. at 112.    
24 Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 345 (1994). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.    
28 Revenue Act of 1948, I.R.S. Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110 (1948).  The IRS proposed that Congress 
enact mandatory joint filing in 1941, but the proposal was defeated.  See Bittker, supra note 11, at 1408–10.  
For additional resources concerning the political debate surrounding the creation of the married filing 
jointly designation, specifically the heightened period of debate between 1913 and 1948, see, for example, 
Revenue Revision, 1934: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 73rd Cong. 111 (1933); 
Revenue Revision, 1947: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways & Means on Revenue Revisions, 80th 
Cong. 890 (1947); ROSWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 44–72 (1943) (this book was 
written as the secondary earner provision was being debated and argued for an equity provision for the 
wife); Alice Kessler-Harris, Taxing Women: Thoughts on a Gendered Economy: Symposium: A Historical 
Outlook: “A Principle of Law But Not of Justice: Men, Women and Income Taxes in the United States,” 6 
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 331, 343–60 (Spring 1997); Godfrey Nelson, Problems Posed by Joint 
Returns, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1941, at 5; Roscoe Pound, Pound Scores Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1941, 
at 12; Women Plan to Fight Joint Tax Return: Miss Kenyon, Miss Donlan Direct Drive, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 
1942, at 16 (noting that women’s coalitions that opposed joint tax returns at the time included the National 
Negro Business and Professional Women’s Club, General Federal of Women’s Club, and National 
Association of Women Lawyers). 
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single economic unit for tax purposes.  Initially, the IRC treated the income of the couple 
as split, allocated equally between the two spouses.29  Congress stated that the married 
filing jointly designation was created to answer the income splitting confusion that was 
occurring in various states and to reduce taxes for married couples: 
Adoption of these income-splitting provisions will produce substantial 
geographical equalization in the impact of the tax on individual incomes. 
The impetuous enactment of community-property legislation by States that 
have long used the common law will be forestalled. The incentive for 
married couples in common-law States to attempt the reduction of their 
taxes by the division of their income through such devices as trusts, joint 
tenancies, and family partnerships will be reduced materially. 
Administrative difficulties stemming from the use of such devices will be 
diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous legislation on the 
income-tax treatment of trusts and family partnerships.30 
Congress assumed that the new joint filing rules would reduce the tax burden on families 
because, ultimately, only the husband would be taxed.31  As previously mentioned, 
“income from a high income, high marginal rate husband, [could be shifted] to a low 
income, low marginal rate wife (until enough income had been shifted to put both 
spouses in the same tax bracket).”32  Thus, even if the wife did work, if her income was 
less than her husband’s income, the couple could still benefit from joint filing. 
¶11 Nevertheless, Congress’ purported reasons for creating the married filing jointly 
option do not cohere with the evidence available at the time.  Research conducted for 
discussion of the legislation in the congressional record stated that by 1947 “only about 
one in ten families would benefit from joint filing; statements before the Ways and 
Means Committee put the figure at 5%.”33  Most married couples at the time were not 
sufficiently wealthy to benefit from income splitting, because most married couples 
earned less than $40,000.34  Congress actually was enacting policy that primarily favored 
wealthy, married men.  The legal and social norms at the time placed married women at a 
subordinate level to their husbands.  Justice Roberts’ reasoning in Poe35 and the fact that 
99% of the members of Congress in 1948 were men36 indicate that married women—
even women in general—were not well situated to create or influence the preparation of 
new laws.37  Although no congressman or senator explicitly stated this at the time, “the 
common pattern . . . is for Congress not to mention less noble reasons for change.”38 
                                                 
29 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 54.   
30 S. REP. NO. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1948). 
31 Maschka, supra note 2.    
32 Zelenak, supra note 24, at 344–45.  As a result, control was often bestowed upon the economically 
dominant spouse in the relationship, which in many cases was the husband.  Id. 
33 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 48–49.   
34 Id. at 47–49.  In 1948, couples earning less than $40,000 were taxed in the lowest income tax bracket.   
35 282 U.S. 101, 112 (1930).   
36 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 57.   
37 Not all members of Congress disregarded married women’s contributions to their family.  In response to 
New York Representative Frank Crowther’s statement that it was inequitable for the husband to income 
split with his wife when he solely earned the income, Texas Senator Tom Connally argued “[t]hat is not 
true.  I don’t care whether the Treasurer says it or who said it, it is not true, and as to that under our law it is 
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¶12 Another crucial factor behind the creation of the married filing jointly designation 
was to maintain the wife’s place as a homemaker and not necessarily a worker.  After 
World War II, Congress wanted women to relinquish their jobs so those jobs could be 
filled by soldiers returning home.39  In fact, the author of the joint filing plan, Stanley 
Surrey, wrote in 1948 that “wives need not continue to master the details of the retail 
drug business, electrical equipment business, or construction business, but may return 
from their partnership ‘duties’ to the pursuit of homemaking.”40  McCaffery notes that 
“[t]here was much hope, or rather much assuming, that the end of the war would mean a 
return to normalcy in another sense: married women, especially mothers, would leave the 
workforce they had entered during the war as part of the wartime production effort, and 
go back home.”41  Once again, Congress’ rationale was that only the husband’s income 
would be taxed because the wife would remain in or return to the home.  The husband 
could then reduce the couple’s taxes by shifting income to the lower tax bracket of his 
non-working wife.   
¶13 The ultimate consequence, though, of the implementation of the married filing 
jointly designation was the creation of the secondary earner bias.   
B. Married Women and the Secondary Earner Bias 
¶14 “[N]o one saw the secondary-earner bias because there were so few secondary 
earners [in 1948] . . . no one paid any significant attention to working wives.”42  The joint 
filing rules emerged in 1948 at a time when most married women worked at home; since 
that time, however, an increasing number of married women have moved into the labor 
force, and for this reason, they are subject to a possible secondary earner bias.43  To 
understand the secondary earner bias, it is important to understand both the nature of the 
law and the reality of married women’s market choices.  First, recall that the law treats 
married couples as a single economic unit and imposes progressive tax rates on both 
                                                                                                                                                 
not all earned by the husband; it is joint earnings of the wife who stays at home, raises the children and 
helps economize in the kitchen; she is contributing just as much to the success of the husband as the 
husband is.  It is not true that the husband earns it all and I am sure Dr. Crowther will not go home tonight 
and contend that to Mrs. Crowther.”  Revenue Revision, 1934: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 73rd Cong. 111 (1933). 
38 Zelenak, supra note 24, at 346.   
39 Tso, supra note 1.  Congress had statistics indicating that women were leaving the workforce as the war 
was coming to an end and soldiers were returning home.  See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 51 (“The 
participation rate for women in the labor force [during the war] rose from 27.9% in 1940 to 35.8% in 1945, 
but then dipped back down to 31.5% by 1947; the numbers for married women alone were far lower, and 
for married mothers lower still.”). 
40 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 57. 
41 Id. at 51.   
42 Id. at 58. 
43 Mary E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional 
Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 948 (1986) (“Girls are socialized to 
serve others, to be interested in women’s jobs, to be primarily responsible for child care, and to regard their 
roles as wage earners as secondary to their other material responsibilities.”); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and 
Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 474 (1990) (“The [unemployment] system 
historically excluded women because of their different pattern of labor force participation and because it 
viewed women’s income as secondary.”); Stephanie Hoffer, Adopting the Family Taxable Unit, 76 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 55, 88 (2007) (“Secondary earner bias is a characteristic that the family taxable unit unfortunately 
shares with joint filing . . . .”). 
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individuals’ combined income.  The law effectively requires “stacking”44 one spouse’s 
income atop the other for purposes of determining the total tax burden.45 
¶15 The income of the spouse that is stacked at the higher level is taxed at higher tax 
rates.46  Due to the benefit of income splitting under a progressive tax rate schedule, a 
couple’s tax liability can potentially be decreased through shifting income from the 
higher earning spouse to the lower income spouse’s tax bracket.  For a couple to fully 
realize the benefit of income splitting, the IRC makes it more favorable for the higher 
income to be placed at the bottom and the lower income to be stacked at the top.  In other 
words, couples implicitly decide which spouse’s income is primary and which spouse’s 
income is secondary for tax purposes.  By placing the higher income in the lower level, 
the higher income can be shifted to the lower tax brackets and thus decrease income 
taxes.   
¶16 The higher income possibly loses the benefit of the income shift with the addition 
of the lower income.  Once the shifted income exhausts the lower tax bracket limit, a 
couple is moved to the next higher tax bracket and higher taxes are due.  On top of that, 
because of the income shift of the higher income to the lower tax brackets and the fact 
that the lower income is stacked above the higher income, the lower income amount is 
initially taxed in the next higher income tax bracket.  Under the current law, a married 
man is guaranteed to incur a tax rate of 10% on the first dollar earned, but married 
women (if they indeed are secondary earners) must face a rate of 25, 28, 33, or 35%.47  
These rules have notable effects for married women at all income levels.  “[S]econdary 
earners among the poor can face tax rates well in excess of 50%, sometimes even 
exceeding 100%,”48 while middle- and upper-income married couples lose an average of 
78% of the secondary earner’s income.49  
¶17 This leaves couples in the position of having to decide which spouse’s earnings are 
primary and secondary50 and whether the secondary earner’s income is benefiting or 
penalizing the family financially.  If women cannot get paid an amount sufficient to cover 
the costs associated with market labor (such as clothing, commuting, and child care 
costs), then they will be less likely to work outside the home.51  Importantly, it is 
women’s after-tax salary that must be considered.52  
                                                 
44 Tso, supra note 1. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 For tax rates for married filing jointly, see infra note 59.  See also Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and 
Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2009 (1999) (“Single 
workers and married men face a marginal tax rate schedule that starts at zero and rises gradually as 
earnings rise, but wives, as secondary earners, face a marginal tax rate schedule that begins in the tax rate 
determined by their husband’s earnings.”).  As a result, the wife, as the secondary earner, cannot take 
advantage of having her income taxed at zero tax or lower tax rates because her husband has already done 
so. 
48 Tso, supra note 1 (citing MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21).  What McCaffery is supposing is possible 
because of the loss of various welfare and social benefits for the poor.     
49 Id. at 21.    
50 Lora Cicconi, Comment, Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution: An Examination of 
Gender-based Tax Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 257, 267 
(2006–2007) (“Since joint filing pools two incomes and then applies the appropriate exemptions and tax 
rates to calculate a couple’s tax liability number, it encourages couples to think in terms of a primary earner 
and a secondary earner.”). 
51 See infra note 65. 
52 See Maschka, supra note 2.   
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¶18 In most marriages, secondary earners are women, not men.53  This is because, for 
one, wives on average earn less than their husbands.54  Second, many married women 
have children and decide to leave the workforce, temporarily or altogether, to become the 
primary caregivers in the home.  Because husbands are frequently able to continue 
working despite changes in family size, they are often solidified as the primary earners 
and their wives as the secondary earners.55  This nomenclature is in no way intended to 
be derogatory, but rather descriptive of modern family dynamics.56  Thus, as married 
women enter the workplace initially or return after an absence, it is they who usually face 
the tax penalties associated with secondary earner status.57 
1. Illustrating the Secondary Earner Bias with Three Hypothetical Taxpayers 
¶19 This section examines three hypothetical married couples with different levels of 
income in order to illustrate when and how the secondary earner bias surfaces.58  The first 
example involves a married couple in which only the husband works in the paid labor 
force; the second example involves a married couple in which both spouses earn the same 
level of market income; and the third involves a married couple in which both spouses 
earn income, but the husband earns more than his wife.  In all three scenarios, because 
each couple ultimately pays the same amount of taxes, the focus can be on the economic 
disadvantages to the secondary earner in the family, if one spouse is so classified.  
¶20 Example One: Consider a married couple in which only the husband works, earning 
an annual income of $80,000.  Under the current code provisions, the couple will owe 
income taxes of $12,375.59  Utilizing a progressive tax rate schedule, the IRC breaks 
down the $80,000 into tax brackets or levels based on the amount of income earned.  The 
couple is paying 10% on the first $16,700 of income, 15% on $51,200 of the next level of 
income, and 25% on $12,100 of the last level of income.60   The average effective tax 
                                                 
53 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21.  See also Michael Bar & Oksana Leukhina, To Work or Not to Work:  
Did Tax Reforms Affect Labor Force Participation of Married Couples?, 9 B.E. J. OF MACROECONOMICS 
(2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol9/iss1/art28/ (noting that between 1960 and 2000, the 
number of two earner families in the United States increased from 34% to 77%.  In 1959 and 1999, 95% 
and 79%, respectively, of secondary earners were married women).   
54 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21.   
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Alstott, supra note 47, at 2009.    
58 These examples exclude applicable deductions, exemptions, and credits to simplify the focus on how the 
secondary earner bias arises.   
59 Income tax is calculated using IRC 2009 schedule for married filing jointly under I.R.C. §1(a)(2), 
amendment in Rev. Proc. 08-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, tbl.1 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2008-45_IRB/ar14.html. 
 
If the taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $16,700 10% of taxable income
Over $16,700 but not over $67,900 $1670, plus 15% of the excess over $16,700 
Over $67,900 but not over $137,050 $9350, plus 25% of the excess over $67,900 
Over $137,050 but not over $208,850 $26,637.50, plus 28% of the excess over $137,050
Over $208,850 but not over $372,950 $46,741.50, plus 33% of the excess over $208,850
Over $372,950 $100,894.50, plus 35% of the excess over $372,950  
 
60 Id. 
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rate is 15%.61  If the wife decides to enter into the workforce, her income will be stacked 
on top of her husband’s income, and thus her very first dollar will be subject to a 25% tax 
rate—the highest marginal rate imposed on her husband.62  This means that the wife’s 
average effective tax rate will be at least 10% more than her husband’s rate.63   
¶21 Example Two: Now consider a married couple in which both spouses work and 
earn the same salary of $40,000, for a total of $80,000.  Their income tax due is $12,375, 
with an average effective tax rate of 15%.  In this context, we cannot be sure whether the 
married woman is the secondary earner or not.  If she decides to leave the workforce but 
later re-enter at a salary lower than her husband’s, then she will suffer the same economic 
consequences discussed in Example One.  But if both remain in the workforce, the 
portion of income taxed in the higher 25% bracket comes from neither spouse’s income 
disproportionately; in this scenario, there is no clear secondary earner in the family and 
equal tax treatment of both spouses’ incomes.    
¶22 Example Three: Finally, consider a married couple in which both spouses work but 
the husband earns more than the wife.  The husband earns $60,000 and the wife earns 
$20,000, totaling $80,000.  Their income tax, like those of the couples discussed above, is 
$12,375, with an average effective tax rate of 15%.  Assume the wife is the secondary 
earner, and thus her income is stacked on top of the husband’s income.  The IRC 
allocates taxes against the $60,000 of income first and then the $20,000 of income.  The 
couple realizes a benefit, because they are able to shift a portion of the higher income to 
lower tax brackets.  However, this benefit becomes limited with the addition of the wife’s 
$20,000 of income.  Her income is taxed at the highest marginal tax rate of her 
husband’s—25%.  The wife is mistaken if she thinks she is bringing in net income of 
$17,000, which is her $20,000 income applied to the average effective tax rate of 15%.  
The wife is actually netting only $15,000, which is her $20,000 applied to the marginal 
tax rate of 25%.64 
¶23 With these three examples, it should now be obvious that the tax laws provide a 
distinct disincentive for many married women to work in the paid labor force.  Consider 
again the wife in the couple from Example One above and assume she decides to re-enter 
the workforce after having children.  After paying income taxes, social security taxes, 
state and local taxes, childcare expenses, transportation expenses to and from work, 
among other expenses, it is possible that the wife, and the family as a whole, will not 
acquire any financial gain from her returning to work.65  Indeed, once a married woman 
                                                 
61 The effective tax rate is the average rate at which a person is taxed on his taxable or earned income.  The 
effective tax rate is calculated by dividing the total tax due by total amount of taxable income.  Thus, the 
effective tax rate in this example equals $12,376 divided by $80,000.   
62 See Tso, supra note 1.  
63 In this context, the effective tax rate is the average rate at which a person is taxed on his taxable or 
earned income.  Please note that if the wife earned more than her husband, her income would have been 
considered first. 
64 Note that if the wife earned more than her husband, her income would have been considered first and the 
husband would suffer the secondary earner bias.  McCaffery provides further numerical examples of how 
married women as secondary earners are penalized.  See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 84. 
65 See Tso, supra note 1; see also Maschka, supra note 2.  Maschka uses her and her husband’s income as 
an example.  If her husband pays an estimated 8% federal income tax and a 10% state and local tax, her 
husband would make $0.68 for every dollar earned on his $59,400 salary, under an effective tax rate of 
14%.  If Maschka decides to work and earns $20,000, she would have to add the social security and state 
and local income taxes plus estimated childcare expenses of $6000.  As a result, she would only make 
$0.27 on the dollar, under an effective tax rate of 25%.  This calculation does not include the additional 
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leaves the workforce, she is less likely to re-enter it given the high marginal taxes.66  This 
structure leads women who do decide to re-enter the workforce to seek to counteract the 
high marginal taxes by undertaking a variety of strategies, such as changing the way in 
which they are compensated (e.g., paid cash wages or non-taxable fringe benefits).67  
Primary earners in the family do not face the same high marginal tax rates on the first 
dollar earned and thus need not take such action. 
2. Married Filing Separately Designation is an Option but not Economically Feasible 
¶24 A complete discussion of how the tax laws affect married women includes mention 
of the fact that married couples need not file jointly and thus be subject to the analyses set 
forth above.  They also have the option of filing separately.  Today, however, individual 
filing is different from the discrete individual approach adhered to under the IRC between 
1913 and 1948.68  Currently, under the married filing separately designation, each 
spouse’s individual income will be taxed according to a designated progressive tax 
schedule different from the schedule for married filing jointly taxpayers.69  There are 
limited advantages in filing separately.70  For example, if one spouse owes a significant 
amount of income taxes and the other does not or if one spouse sold his home and wants 
to qualify for profit exclusion, separate filing might be rational.71  
¶25 In general, however, a couple’s taxes are likely to be quite a bit higher if they file 
separately than if they file jointly.72  For instance, a married couple earning $80,000 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
expenses she might have to pay (e.g., expenses for clothes and meals).  Because of the tax burden, Maschka 
and her husband decided that she would not work and remain at home. 
66 JOINT ECON. COMM., REPORT ON REDUCING MARRIAGE TAXES:  ISSUES AND PROPOSALS: A JOINT 
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE STUDY 5 (Comm. Print May 1998) (“High marginal taxes may not induce women 
to leave the workforce to the same extent that low marginal tax rates encourage them to enter.”).    
67 Id.    
68 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 15–16.   
69 The following is the IRC 2009 schedule for married filing separately under I.R.C. §1(d), amendment in 
Rev. Proc. 08-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, tbl.4 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2008-
45_IRB/ar14.html.    
 
If the taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $8350 10% of taxable income
Over $8350 but not over $33,950 $835, plus 15% of the excess over $8350 
Over $33,950 but not over $68,525 $4675, plus 25% of the excess over $33,950 
Over $68,525 but not over $104,425 $13,318.75, plus 28% of the excess over $68,525 
Over $104,425 but not over $186,475 $23,370.75, plus 33% of the excess over $104,425 
Over $186,475 $50,447.25, plus 35% of the excess over $186,475 
 
See supra note 59 for the married filing jointly schedule.  
70 See Sandra Block, ‘Til Taxes Do You Part: When Married Couples Should File Separately, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 4, 2003, at 3B.  Other reasons for married couples to file separately include one spouse reneging on 
child support payments or student loan payments, one spouse incurring an excessive amount of 
unreimbursed medical expenses, and one spouse having an excessive amount of itemized deductions. 
71 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 16.   
72 I.R.S. Pub. No. 501, supra note 5, at 6.  An overwhelming majority of couples file jointly.  See I.R.S. 
Pub. No. 1304, supra note 9, at tbl.1.2 (on average, only about 4% of couples filed separately from 2003 to 
2006); MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 16 (“‘[M]arried, filing separately’ . . . is simply a clerical matter, and 
rarely used, because almost every couple would pay more tax if the spouses filed this way.”). 
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filing jointly will pay $12,375 (ignoring deductions, adjustments or credits).73  However, 
if they file separately, the husband earning $60,000 and the wife $20,000, their combined 
tax will be $13,770 (again, before any adjustments, deductions, or credits).74  This 
increase of $1395 is illustrative of the increased tax liability that couples would face 
filing separately, and thus 96% of couples choose joint filing.75 
C. Congressional Efforts to Minimize the Secondary Earner Bias 
¶26 Congress has recognized that joint filing is the best option for married couples, but 
at the same time that it imposes serious economic costs on married women.  Accordingly, 
legislators have sought to address this problem in numerous ways over the course of the 
past forty years.  In 1964, Congress reduced the marginal income tax rate from 91% to 
71%—eliminating some of the penalty associated with stacking the secondary earner’s 
income on top of the primary earner’s income.76  In 1973, the Joint Economic Committee 
of Congress held a session entitled Economic Problems of Women to discuss the income 
tax consequences for working mothers in an effort to explore the problems and consider 
additional possible solutions.77  In the late 1980s, another session entitled Tax Treatment 
of Married, Head of Household, and Single Taxpayers was held by the House Ways and 
Means Committee.78   
¶27 Although the committees did not lead to actual reforms, in 198179 Congress sought 
to directly address the secondary earner bias by enacting a credit for secondary earners 
pursuant to Section 221 of the Economic and Tax Recovery Act of 1981 (Act).80  Under 
the Act, marginal income tax rates were reduced to 50% and a credit for two-earner 
couples was created.81  The credit allowed two-earner couples to deduct 5% in 1982 (and 
                                                 
73 See supra note 59 for the married filing jointly schedule. 
74 See supra note 69 for the married filing separately schedule.  The husband’s tax is $11,187.50.  The 
wife’s tax is $2582.50.  Note that if each earned $40,000 per year for a total of $80,000 and filed separately 
instead of jointly, each would incur income tax, before any adjustments, deductions or credits, of $6187.60.  
Their total income tax would be $12,375.  This is the same amount as if the couple had filed jointly. 
However, this occurs when the earnings are the same for each spouse.  This does not occur when one 
spouse earns substantially more than the other spouse, as is the case for many couples in the United States 
where the husband earns more than the wife.   
75 I.R.S. Pub. No. 1304, supra note 9, at tbl.1.2. 
76 Revenue Act of 1964, I.R.S. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964).  Note that secondary earners are 
heavily taxed by marginal tax rates.  
77 Economic Problems of Women: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 93rd Cong. 240 (1973). 
78 Id.  Note that although Congress was having sessions that addressed the income tax impact of the 
secondary earner, Congress did not enact any substantive legislative bills from 1969 to 1981.  During the 
Tax Treatment of Married, Head of Household and Single Taxpayers hearing, many researchers, advocates 
and some congressmen promoted the idea of mandatory single filing or optional single filing for married 
couples but with reduced tax consequences.   
79 In 1975, the Earned Income Tax Credit was created to encourage low-income parents to work.  Under the 
credit, working parents receive a stated amount for each child.  The credit is refundable, meaning that even 
if the parent(s)’ tax liability is zero, they can still receive the credit.  See Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, 
Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 970 (1975); see also Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 
623–24 (1996); IRS.gov, It’s easier than ever to find out if you qualify for EITC, 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96406,00.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
80 Pub. L. No 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).  For further discussion of the Act, see S. REP. NO. 97-144 (1981).   
81 Id. 
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then 10% in 1983 and beyond) of the secondary earner’s income, up to a limit of 
$30,000.82  The credit resulted in limited relief for secondary earners.83   
¶28 Surprisingly, in the mid-1980s, women’s groups and social conservatives began 
protesting the credit.84  Many felt that the credit was degrading to women and that 
working mothers were being given an unfair tax advantage over women who chose not to 
work.85  Helen M. Coyne, president of Mothers at Home, Inc., testified before Congress 
that “America’s families want a Tax Code which is career neutral; that is, a code which 
does not create an unfair economic advantage for either two-career families or families 
choosing to have one spouse stay home.”86  Under political pressure, Congress repealed 
the secondary earner credit in 1986.87 
¶29 The failed credit, however, did not deter legislators from continued attempts to 
reform the tax laws to eliminate the secondary earner bias.  Perhaps the most noteworthy 
mechanism for addressing the problem emerged in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.88   
Under the Act, the maximum marginal income tax rate was lowered from 50% to 28%, 
thereby drastically reducing bias.89  Since 1986, however, federal legislation has not been 
enacted that would fully eliminate the bias for married women embedded in the tax 
code.90   
D. The Next Step: Looking Outside the United States for Answers  
¶30 Congress has been unsuccessful in combating the secondary earner bias.  Since the 
Reagan administration, Congress has not focused extensively on lessening or eliminating 
the secondary bias, because in most instances, the secondary bias is a woman’s issue.91  
“Any attempt to change the law to ‘favor’ working wives is viewed as ‘social 
engineering’ or as subverting ‘family values.’”92  Although Congress attempted to 
eliminate the bias with a tax credit in 1981, this reform was repealed and, in any case, not 
altogether effective.  The adjustment of the marginal tax rates in and since the 1986 tax 
reform was insufficient as well.  Furthermore, the United States’ practice of aggregating 
income under joint filing for married couples is rather uncommon in comparison with 
                                                 
82 I.R.C. § 221(b)(2) (1981). 
83 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 74–75.   
84 Id. at 80.  During President Clinton’s term, the marginal income tax rate was raised again to maximum of 
39.6%.  See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 (1993).  Candidate 
George W. Bush campaigned in 2000 for the re-institution of the secondary earner credit.  See Maschka, 
supra note 2.  Between 2001 and 2003, President Bush reduced the marginal income tax rate to 35%.  See 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001); 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).  
85 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 80.   
86 Id. 
87 Id.  The repeal was most likely necessary because although the secondary earner credit was helpful, it 
still had problems, such as a phase-out and time constraints.  With a phase-out, a certain prescribed income 
level earned either individually or jointly reduces the amount of a credit.  Also, when enacting a tax-saving 
vehicle such as a credit, the IRS will often place a time limit on when that measure can be used by the 
taxpayer.  See generally 47B C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 336 (2009), 33 Am. Jur. 2d Tax Credits § 1270 
(2009).   
88 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).   
89 Id. 
90 See supra note 84. 
91 MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 80.  
92 Id.   
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other countries around the world.93  It is time to examine laws outside the United States 
to identify alternative avenues for treating working married women under the IRC. 
¶31 The remainder of this Comment focuses on tax reforms outside of the United 
States, particularly in Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland.  Each of these 
countries have taken steps to ensure that their tax laws do not penalize working married 
women.  It is important to note that government actors often fail to take action on a 
pressing social issue until pressured to do so.  If there is any doubt that protests and 
making one’s voice known against the secondary earner bias can lead to success, one 
need only look at the impetus behind many of the tax reforms currently occurring around 
the world.       
III. EXAMINATION OF THE TAX REFORMS IN MALAYSIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND 
IRELAND  
¶32 In examining the tax reform measures of Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and 
Ireland, this section is structured to show the progression and extent of the tax reforms 
concerning working married women in these countries.  It begins by discussing 
Malaysia’s system, where working married women possess the right to have their income 
assessed in their own names, then moves to the United Kingdom, which has automatic 
separate filing, and ends with a look at Ireland’s system, where working married women 
can participate in a complex single assessment designation and have their income taxed 
individually from their husbands without the couple incurring higher income taxes.  For 
each country, this Comment discusses a brief history of the tax reforms and illustrates 
how each country’s current tax laws operate for married couples.  Malaysia and the 
United Kingdom were chosen to portray the measures in which the people of those 
countries brought about tax reform.  Ireland was chosen to be a direct example of how the 
filing designations for married couples in the IRC should be structured. 
A. Malaysia 
1. Malaysia’s Treatment of Working Married Women 
¶33 In 1957, Malaysia acquired its independence from Great Britain.94  Ten years later, 
Malaysia created its personal income tax system.95  Initially, a married woman’s income 
was combined with her husband’s income and filed in the husband’s name.96  Drawing on 
                                                 
93 Cathal O’Donoghue & Holly Sutherland, Accounting for the Family: The Treatment of Marriage and 
Children in European Income Tax Systems, Innocenti Occasional Papers, Econ. & Social Policy Series, No. 
65, 19–20, http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/eps65.pdf (“France, Portugal and Luxembourg are 
the only countries [in the European Union] with mandatory joint taxation for couples for all incomes.”). 
94 Terence P. Stewart & Margaret L.H. Png, The Growth Triangle of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 
23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 20 (1993).  In 1957, Malaysia was called the Federation of Malaya, 
occupying a portion of southwest Asia.  It was not until 1963 that Malaya and other areas in Asia, including 
Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore, combined to form what is now known as Malaysia.  Singapore separated 
from Malaysia in 1965.  Id. 
95 Income Tax Act, 1967, Act 53, Part II, § 3 (Malay.) (Act No. 47 of 1967), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com.my/kpmg/publications/tax/22/a0053.htm (amended multiple times since 1967).   
96 Jeyapalan Kasipillai, Removing Gender Bias in the Malaysian Tax System, 40 TAX NOTES INT’L 255, 257 
(2005).  This provision fell under the Income Tax Ordinance No. 48 of 1967. 
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the United Kingdom’s traditional model,97 Malaysia considered the married woman an 
“incapacitated person” just like “any infant, lunatic, idiot or insane person.”98  During the 
1970s, organizations such as the Malaysian Trade Union Congress and the United Malay 
National Organisation Wanita lobbied the Malaysian government to change the tax laws 
to make them more favorable to women.99  These groups asserted that “a working wife 
should not be assessed under her husband’s name if she did not wish to be—just as his 
income should not be assessed under her name.”100  Furthermore, “joint taxation was 
neither neutral to marriage nor efficient because it often caused the tax liability of a 
married couple to increase after marriage.”101  The Malaysian government responded 
with a series of tax law amendments, beginning in 1974.102  By 1977, a Malaysian 
married woman could elect to have her income assessed separately from her husband’s, 
but only that part of her income which consisted of employment and professional 
income.103  If a woman did not elect separate assessment of this income, then all of her 
income was considered accumulated by her husband and filed in the husband’s name.104 
¶34 In 1990, the Malaysian government amended Section 45(2) of the Income Tax Act 
of 1967.105  This amendment gave the Malaysian married woman a unique right.  Her 
income was automatically assessed separately from her husband’s income unless she 
chose to assign her tax liability to her husband.106  Under separate assessment, she likely 
would be subject to lower marginal taxes than she otherwise would be as a secondary 
earner.107  Additionally, in 1995, Malaysian married women were granted the option to 
claim child relief.108  Prior to 1995, only the father or husband could claim child relief.109   
¶35 Although there had been progress, many remained unsatisfied with the legal status 
of women in Malaysia.  Particularly, in 1999, Malaysian women’s organizations and 
other individuals formed the Women’s Agenda for Change to curb the inequality 
Malaysians faced in various facets of society and to promote women’s issues.110  Some of 
the organization’s initiatives were to “[e]nact laws and policies to protect women from 
globalisation [sic] and enhance participation through best practices in the workplace, 
                                                 
97 See infra notes 126 to 130.  
98 Tan How Teck, Income Taxation of Husband and Wife in Singapore and Malaysia, 58 BULL. FOR INT’L 
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 520, 521 (2004). 
99 Id. at 523. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Kasipillai, supra note 96, at 257.  In 1974, married women were granted the right to elect separate 
assessment of their employment income.  In 1977, married women were granted the right to elect separate 
assessment of their employment income and professional services income, which included “income from a 
profession such as legal services, medical, and dental practices.”  Id.  
103 Id. at 257 (“All the income of a married woman from other sources, such as rental income, royalties, and 




107 Kasipillai, supra note 96, at 257. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 WOMEN’S AID ORG., WOMEN’S EQUALITY IN MALAYSIA STATUS REPORT (2001), 
http://www.wao.org.my/news/20010301statusreport.htm#Culture&Religion (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  
Women’s Agenda for Change focused on a number of issues pertaining to women including sexual 
harassment and domestic violence. 
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strategies against sexual harassment, and provision of child-care facilities.”111  Although 
it is not entirely certain that the organization’s efforts accelerated the reforms, in 2000, 
Malaysia further amended its tax treatment of married women.  The Malaysian married 
woman is now treated as a femme sole112 under Malaysia’s tax system.113  Malaysian tax 
law presently gives a wife the choice of whether she wants her income assessed with her 
husband’s income.114  If she does not elect to have her income aggregated with her 
husband’s, then her income is assessed separately.  If her income is assessed separately, 
she is entitled to a personal deduction,115 applicable child relief credit,116 and spousal 
dependent relief credit.117   
¶36 There are some drawbacks to this provision.  Implicit in the election of a separate 
assessment without electing combined treatment is that a wife must make certain that her 
husband does not elect combined treatment either.  If he elects combined treatment, then 
both of their incomes will be assessed in her name.118  Thus, the way in which the 
Malaysian tax system treats married women is not altogether perfect.  Still, the fact that 
the Malaysian government amended its tax code multiple times to give Malaysian 
                                                 
111 Padmaja Padman, Pushing the Women's Agenda Forward, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), May 16, 1999, 
available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/nst-cn.htm.  
112 Femme Sole translates to a woman treated individually or by herself.   
113 Jeyapalan Kasipillai, New Tax System Removes Gender Bias, STAR ONLINE (Malay.), May 12, 2007, 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/5/12/business/17641588&sec=. 
114 Finance (No. 2) Act, 2000, § 608.9 (Malay.).  Section 45(2) of the Income Tax Act 1967, as amended by 
§ 608.9, states:  
 
(2) Subject to this section, where an individual and his wife were living together in the basis year 
for a year of assessment and did not in that basis year cease to live together or to be husband and 
wife of each other--(a) the wife may elect in writing (wife who elects) that her total income shall 
be aggregated with the total income of her husband and assessed in his name for that year of 
assessment; or (b) the husband may elect in writing (husband who elects) that his total income 
shall be aggregated with the total income of his wife and assessed in her name for that year of 
assessment: Provided that where the wife who elects or the husband who elects is not resident for 
the basis year for a year of assessment, such wife or husband, as the case may be, may elect under 
this subsection only if she or he is a citizen. 
  
  For the purposes of paragraph (2)(b)-- 
(a) for any year of assessment, that paragraph shall only apply if there is no election made by 
a wife or wives under paragraph (2)(a) for that year of assessment; and 
(b) the election shall only be made with one wife.[]; and . . . (4) Where under subsection (2) 
the total income of the wife who elects falls to be aggregated with that of her husband or the 
total income of the husband who elects falls to be aggregated with that of his wife, for a year 
of assessment, the wife who elects or the husband who elects, as the case may be, shall be 
treated as having no chargeable income for that year.   
115 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY COMMERCE 2006: MALAYSIA: PERSONAL TAXES: 
DETERMINATION OF TAXABLE INCOME (2006), available at 2006 WL 10053338.  
116 Kasipillai, supra note 96, at 257.   
117 Finance (No. 2) Act of 2000, Malaysia Act 608.9 (Malay.).  The spousal dependent relief is a credit that 
either spouse can use if the other spouse elects for combined treatment or has no taxable income for the 
year.  Thus, if the husband elects combined treatment or the husband has no taxable income for the tax 
year, the wife can use the dependent relief credit.  The spousal dependent credit for 2007 amounted to RM 
3000 (in Malaysian currency).  It is possible for the husband to have greater tax savings regardless of 
whether his wife files with him or separately.  The credit for the husband produces this potential result.  
The same treatment is given to the husband if the wife elects combined treatment or the wife has no taxable 
income for the year.  In a case where the husband has several wives, the husband can apply the credit to 
only one wife. 
118 Id.   
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married women options is remarkable for a country in which women and men are not 
considered equal under most laws.119  In fact, the cultural norm in Malaysia is that 
married women will remain in the home and raise the children.120  
¶37 Undoubtedly, though, the Malaysian government has taken profound steps to lessen 
gender bias in its tax laws.  “The introduction of independent taxation of a wife beginning 
in 1990 recognizes the contribution of women to the well-being of the country.”121  
Consequently, married women have a better position than they previously had, primarily 
because they can now make more choices.  Malaysian tax laws place married women “at 
the bargaining table” to discuss with their husbands not only how their income should be 
treated but also what would be best for the family as whole. 
2. Illustrating Malaysia’s Tax Code 
¶38 This section illustrates how three Malaysian couples are taxed under the Malaysian 
tax code and determines whether the secondary earner bias arises in any of these cases.  
The first example involves a couple that selects combined treatment, the second example 
involves a couple in which each spouse earns the same salary but they opt out of 
combined treatment, and the third example involves a couple that opts out of combined 
treatment but the husband earns substantially more than the wife.  In all three examples, 
the applicable deductions and credits are excluded to focus on the differences in spousal 
and base tax liability.  The Malaysian progressive income tax schedule122 is employed for 
                                                 
119 WOMEN’S AID ORGANIZATION, WOMEN’S EQUALITY IN MALAYSIA STATUS REPORT (2001), 
http://www.wao.org.my/news/20010301statusreport.htm#Culture&Religion. 
120 Id.  Between 1998 and 2006, women averaged 36% of Malaysia’s workforce; see table below.  
International Labour Organization, LABORSTA Database, Malaysia—Tbl. 2A: Employment General 
Level, available at http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  Note that this data represents a 




 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Men  5,718,900 5,851,200 6,086,300 6,055,900 6,141,800 6,323,600 6,390,400 6,470,500 6,618,600 
Women  2,880,700 2,986,600 3,235,500 3,301,100 3,400,800 3,546,100 3,589,100 3,574,800 3,656,800 




33% 34% 35% 35% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 
 
121 Kasipillai, supra note 96, at 257.   
122 The income tax rate schedule for Malaysia is included below.  Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 
Individual, Income Tax Rate, Year 2008, 
http://www.hasil.gov.my/lhdnv3e/individuIndex.jsp?process=21000&menu=13&expandable=1 (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2009).  Note that income is in ringgit (RM), the Malaysian currency.  
 
Taxable Income RM Rate Tax (RM) 
On the first 2,500 0% 0
On the next 2,500 1% 25 
On the first 5,000 - 25 
On the next 15,000 3% 450 
On the first 20,000 - 475 
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each example to compute the taxes due.  The average effective tax rate123 is calculated as 
well. 
¶39 Example One: Consider a Malaysian couple who earns 80,000 RM (approximately 
$21,913)124 for the taxable year.  If the couple elects combined assessment in one 
spouse’s name, or if one of them did not earn any income during the taxable year, leaving 
only one spouse’s income to be assessed, their tax liability would be 9675 RM 
(approximately $2650), with an average effective tax rate of 12%.  The couple is exposed 
to a marginal income tax rate of 24%.  However, if the wife, for example, decides to 
work and opts to have her income assessed separately, the couple’s taxes are likely to be 
lower, as shown in the following examples.   
¶40 Example Two: Consider a Malaysian couple in which each spouse earns the same 
income, for instance 40,000 RM (approximately $10,957), totaling 80,000 RM 
(approximately $21,913).  If they are assessed separately, their tax liability equals 2175 
RM (approximately $596) each, totaling 4350 RM (approximately $1192).  This is 5325 
RM (approximately $1459), less than if they had elected combined treatment.  The 
average effective tax rate for each spouse is 5% and each spouse is exposed to a marginal 
income tax rate of 13%.   
¶41 Example Three: Lastly, consider a Malaysian couple in which the wife earns 
substantially less than her husband, for instance 20,000 RM (approximately $5478) and 
the husband earns 60,000 RM (approximately $16,435), totaling 80,000 RM 
(approximately $21,913).  If they are assessed separately, the taxes due would be 475 RM 
(approximately $130) for the wife (average effective tax rate of 2%, marginal income tax 
rate of 3%) and 4125 RM (approximately $1230) for the husband (average effective tax 
rate of 7%, marginal income tax rate of 19%).  Their total tax is 4600 RM (approximately 
$1260), which is 5075 RM (approximately $1390) less than if they had elected combined 
treatment.   
¶42 These three examples suggest that there is no secondary earner bias in the 
Malaysian system, especially when couples are assessed separately.  The only instance in 
which there might be a secondary earner bias is in Example One where the couple elects 
                                                                                                                                                 
On the next 15,000 7% 1050 
On the first 35,000 - 1525 
On the next 15,000 13% 1950 
On the first 50,000 - 3475 
On the next 20,000 19% 3800 
On the first 70,000 - 7275 
On the next 30,000 24% 7200 
On the first 100,000 - 14,475 
On the next 50,000 27% 13,500 
On the first 150,000 - 27,975 
On the next 100,000 27% 27,000 
On the first 250,000 - 54,975 
Exceeding 250,000 28% -
   
123 For the formula for average effective tax rate, see supra note 61. 
124 Income is in ringgit (RM), the Malaysian currency, with approximate US dollar equivalent as of March 
21, 2009.  See MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/detail/stock_quote?Symbol=/MYRUS (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2009).  
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combined treatment and is exposed to marginal income tax rate of 24%.  However, this 
outcome does not necessary control because the wife can opt out of joint filing. 
B. United Kingdom 
1. The United Kingdom’s Treatment of Working Married Women 
¶43 In 1799, the United Kingdom125 created its tax system and instituted joint filing for 
married couples.126  Between 1799 and 1990, the United Kingdom’s income tax system 
contained gender bias in favor of the husband.127  Only the married man possessed the 
right to file a joint return for his wife and himself.128  If, during the tax year, the married 
woman earned any income and even if she elected to have that income assessed 
separately under the Wife’s Earning Election,129 her non-labor income, including her 
investment income, was still attributed to her husband.130  Although there were many 
reforms to the tax system prior to 1990, including the Married Women’s Property Act in 
1882,131 provisions to allow a married women’s income to have the same tax relief 
provisions as those of single filers,132 and the Finance Act 1978,133 many married and 
unmarried women in the United Kingdom felt that the reforms were insufficient.134  
¶44 John A. Kay and Mervyn A. King, authors of The British Tax System, declared, 
“[t]he British system rests on the dependency principle.  The wife’s income is simply 
treated as if it were the husband’s, and in recognition of the burden which she imposes on 
                                                 
125 The United Kingdom is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  Central 
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: United Kingdom, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/uk.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).    
126 Janet G. Stotsky, Gender Bias in Tax Systems, 14 TAX NOTES INT’L 1913, 1917 (1997).  
127 Note that the legal norm for eighteenth century common law was that “the husband and wife became 
one person by marriage, and common law added the rider that the husband became that person.”  52 JOHN 
HODDINOTT & CHRISTOPHER ADAM, INT’L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., TESTING NASH BARGAINING 
HOUSEHOLD MODELS WITH TIME-SERIES DATA 3 (1998), available at 
http://www.ifpri.cgiar.org/sites/default/files/publications/dp52.pdf (internal quotation omitted). 
128 Stotsky, supra note 126, at 1917. 
129 Previously, the United Kingdom instituted a Wife’s Earnings Election whereby the wife could have her 
income, excluding investment income, taxed separately from her husband’s income.  The election was 
abolished in 1990 due to the creation of independent filing.  Additional requirements for the Wife’s 
Earnings Election and separate assessment include “the couple are married and living together, and all the 
income of the wife would be treated as that of the husband for tax purposes but for the election.”  HM 
REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RELIEF INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL: WIFE’S EARNINGS ELECTION, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/remanual/re1400c.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
130 Stotsky, supra note 126, at 1917. 
131 Id. at 1917.  (The Married Women’s Property Act of 1882 “allowed women to retain management and 
control of their separate property and earnings.”  The 1978 Finance Act “gave married women the right to 
receive their own withholding repayments.”). 
132 Id.  Previously, the United Kingdom instituted separate assessment whereby the wife could opt to have 
her income taxed separately from her husband’s income.  Separate assessment was abolished in 1990 due to 
the creation of independent filing.  Additional requirements for separate assessment include that “the 
couple are married and living together, and the income of the wife is treated as that of the husband for tax 
purposes.”  See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RELIEF INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL: SEPARATE ASSESSMENT: 
WHEN CAN SEPARATE ASSESSMENT APPLY, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/remanual/RE1312.htm (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2009).  
133 Stotsky, supra note 126, at 1917–18 (the 1978 Finance Act “gave married women the right to receive 
their own withholding repayments”).  
134 Id.   
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him he receives a specially enhanced personal allowance.”135  In the late 1970s and 
1980s, many other commentators and academics demanded that the United Kingdom’s 
government amend the tax laws in recognition of women.136  After reading about the tax 
laws in periodicals such as the United Kingdom’s Sunday Times and Woman’s Own, over 
36,000 readers registered to protest the tax laws.137  Parliament responded to the public, 
organizations, and commentators by amending the tax laws in favor of women.  Through 
the Finance Act of 1988, which became effective in 1990, Parliament first authorized 
separate filing for married couples.138   
¶45 Under current regulations,139 independent taxation stipulates that “the incomes of a 
husband and wife are assessed separately in any case.”140  Thus, there is automatic 
independent filing for each spouse.  Each spouse is entitled to applicable allowances to 
reduce his or her tax liability.141   
¶46 The United Kingdom’s tax code still contains gender bias.  For instance, consider 
the married couple’s allowance.142  The married couple’s allowance, equivalent to a tax 
                                                 
135 JOHN A. KAY & MERVYN A. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 206 (Oxford Univ. Press) (2d ed. 1980).   
136 Stotsky, supra note 126, at 1918. 
137 Norma Briggs, Individual Income Taxation and Social Benefits in Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
U.S.A.: A Study of Their Interrelationships and Their Effects on Lower-Income Couples and Single Heads 
of Households, 39 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 243, 244 (1985) (internal quotation omitted).   
138 Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/ukpga_19880039_en_4#pt3-ch1-pb2.  Note that the Finance Act of 
1988 has been amended multiple times.   
139 Income Tax Act, 2007, c. 3, § 45–55 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/legResults.aspx?LegType=All%20Primary&PageNumber=1&BrowseLetter=
I&NavFrom=1&activeTextDocId=3309124.   
140 HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RELIEF INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL: SEPARATE ASSESSMENT: WHEN CAN 
SEPARATE ASSESSMENT APPLY, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/remanual/RE1312.htm (last visited Sept. 
22, 2009). 
141 HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RATES AND ALLOWANCES – INCOME TAX, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/it.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  Note the following table is pounds (£), 
United Kingdom’s currency.  Applicable credits/allowances include:  
 
Income Tax Allowances 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 
Personal Allowance £5225 £6035 £6475 
Personal Allowance for people aged 65–74(1) £7550 £9030 £9490 
Personal Allowance for people aged 75 and over(1) £7690 £9180 £9640 
Married Couple’s Allowance (born before 6th April 1935 
but aged under 75)(1)(2)(3) 
£6285 £6535 Not 
applicable
Married Couple’s Allowance (aged 75 and over)(1)(2) £6365 £6625 £6965 
Income limit for age-related allowances £20,900 £21,800 £22,900
Minimum amount of Married Couple’s Allowance £2440 £2540 £2670 
Blind Person’s Allowance £1730 £1800 £1890 
(1) These allowances reduce where the income is above the income limit – by £1 for every £2 of 
income above the limit. However they will never be less than the basic Personal Allowance or 
minimum amount of Married Couple’s Allowance. 
(2) Tax relief for the Married Couple's allowance is given at the rate of 10 per cent. 
(3) In the 2009–10 tax year all Married Couple's Allowance claimants in this category will become 75 
at some point during the year and will therefore be entitled to the higher amount of the allowance - for 
those aged 75 and over. 
142 Income Tax Act, 2007, c. 3, § 45–55 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/legResults.aspx?LegType=All%20Primary&PageNumber=1&BrowseLetter=
I&NavFrom=1&activeTextDocId=3309124.  The Income Tax Act of 2007 further defined the married 
couple’s allowance: 
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credit in the IRC, can reduce each spouse’s income tax liability.143  The qualifications for 
the allowance are based on when the couple wed and the age of the spouses.144  
Specifically, if the couple wed before December 5, 2005, and at least one spouse was 
born before April 6, 1935, then only the husband can use the allowance to reduce his tax 
liability.145  If the couple wed after December 5, 2005, or are in a civil partnership and at 
least one spouse was born before April 6, 1935, “the person with the higher income can 
claim Married Couple’s Allowance.”146  As in the United States, women in the United 
Kingdom earn less than men on average.147  Thus, it is likely that it is the husband who 
can initially claim the married couple’s allowance.   
¶47 Yet, the married couple’s allowance should not be dismissed.  According to the 
provisions of the married couple’s allowance, one spouse can transfer any unused portion 
of the allowance to the other spouse.148  Thus, with independent filing, the wife can still 
use the married couple’s allowance to reduce her own tax liability, but likely only after 
the husband has used a portion of it.  This treatment of an allowance or credit is 
completely unlike the IRC’s credits for married couples filing separately.  Under the IRC, 
if the wife decides to file separately from her husband, she and her husband would, in 
most instances, not be able to employ the Hope and Lifetime Educational Credits, Child 
and Dependent Care Credit, Adoption Credit, and Elderly and Disabled Credit.149   
                                                                                                                                                 
§ 46 Marriages and civil partnerships on or after 5 December 2005 
  (1)  If an individual—  
(a) makes a claim for a tax year, and 
(b) meets the conditions set out in subsection (2), the individual is entitled to a tax 
reduction for the tax year of 10% of the amount specified in subsection (3)(a) or (b)(as 
applicable). 
  (2) The conditions are that—  
(a) for the whole or part of the tax year the individual is married or in a civil 
partnership and is living with the spouse or civil partner, 
(b) the marriage took place, or the civil partnership was formed, on or after 5 
December 2005 or, if the marriage took place before that date, an election for the new 
rules to apply is in force for the tax year, 
(c) the individual, or the spouse or civil partner, was born before 6 April 1935, 
(d) the individual meets the requirements of section 56 (residence etc), and 
(e) the individual's net income for the tax year exceeds that of the spouse or civil 
partner or, if they have the same amount of net income for the tax year, the individual 
is specified in an election as the person to be entitled to relief under this section for the 
year.   
Id.  
143 HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, MARRIED COUPLE’S ALLOWANCE – INCLUDES CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/married-allow.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  See supra note 141 for 




147 Kate Bell, Tackling Discrimination Head On, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Aug. 13, 2008, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/tackling_discrimination.html/index.html (“Women in the 
United Kingdom earn on average 16 percent less than men for every hour they work—a significant penalty, 
though it falls below the 23 percent gap between women and men in the United States.”). 
148 HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, MARRIED COUPLE’S ALLOWANCE – INCLUDES CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/married-allow.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  Married couples who 
file separately can also “share” the Blind Couple’s Allowance. 
149 See IRS.gov, Topic 600: Tax Credits, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc600.html (last visited Sept. 22, 
2009).  
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2. Illustrating the United Kingdom’s Tax Code 
¶48 The issue of secondary earner bias does not customarily arise for working married 
women in the United Kingdom because each spouse is taxed individually.150  There is no 
combination of income in which one spouse’s income is stacked up on top of the other’s, 
with the income on the highest level exposed to high marginal taxes.  Instead, each 
spouse’s income is taxed according to his or her own marginal income tax rate based on 
that spouse’s income.  This is proven in the following examples.  Each example excludes 
applicable allowances and employs the United Kingdom’s progressive income tax rate 
schedule for 2008-2009.151 
¶49 Example One: Consider that only the husband works, earning a salary of £80,000 
(approximately $115,707).152  He will be taxed individually and owe incomes taxes of 
£32,000 (approximately $46,283).  If the wife decides to enter the workforce, her income 
taxes will be taxed individually, not considering her husband’s income.   
¶50 Example Two: If both the wife and the husband work, earning identical incomes of 
£40,000 (approximately $57,854), they will be taxed individually, owe the same income 
tax of £16,000 (approximately $23,141), and be exposed to the same marginal and 
effective tax rates.   
¶51 Example Three: Consider that the husband earns £60,000 (approximately $86,780), 
which is substantially higher than the wife’s earnings of £20,000 (approximately 
$28,927).  The basis of each spouse’s income tax liability is each spouse’s individual 
income, not the combined income of the couple.  The husband will owe £24,000 
(approximately $34,712), while the wife will owe £4000 (approximately $5785).  Each 
will be exposed to individual marginal and effective tax rates that are not determinate 
upon the other spouse’s income.   
¶52 As previously stated, these examples indicate that there is no evident secondary 
earner bias for either spouse because each spouse’s income is assessed separately when 
                                                 
150 Note, though, that studies indicate that couples are shifting investment income or unearned income to 
the spouse with the lower marginal income tax rate, usually the wife, to decrease or avoid tax liability.  
Assuming that the investment income belongs to the husband, this shifting could be occurring because the 
husband maintains a dominant position in the couple which leads to the wife feeling as though she is 
secondary or could lead to secondary earner bias if the wife is placed in higher marginal tax bracket/band.  
See Melvin Stephens, Jr. & Jennifer Ward-Batts, The Impact of Separate Taxation on the Intra-Household 
Allocation of Assets: Evidence from the UK, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1989, 1995 (2004), available at 
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/melvins/ukassets_final.pdf (“In many households, this reform 
[independent taxation] created an incentive to transfer a portion or even all of the household’s assets to the 
wife since she faces the lower marginal tax rate.  If she works very little or not at all, then the asset income 
shifted to her may not be taxed at all.”). 
151 The following table is in pounds (£), United Kingdom’s currency, and portrays current United Kingdom 
income tax rates (called Taxable Bands).  See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RATES AND ALLOWANCES – 
INCOME TAX, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/it.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).   
 
Taxable Bands 2008–2009 (£)
Starting Rate: 10% 0–2320
Basic Rate: 20% 0–34,800
Higher Rate: 40% Over 34,800
 
152 Income is in pounds (£), the British currency, with approximate US dollar equivalent as of Mar. 21, 
2009.  See MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/detail/stock_quote?Symbol=/MYRUS (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2009).  
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marginal and effective tax rates are not determinate upon the other spouse’s income.  
Thus, individual filing should relieve working married women of the secondary earner 
bias.   
C. Ireland 
1. Ireland’s Treatment of Working Married Women 
¶53 Although Ireland acquired its independence from the United Kingdom in 1949, 
Ireland initially carried over the United Kingdom’s income tax laws into its own 
system.153  As such, there was initially gender bias in the tax code.154  If married women 
did work, their income was considered earned by the husband.155  Additionally, before 
the mid-1990s, Ireland applied a heavy marginal tax rate to labor, which directly affected 
secondary earners.156  Thus, it cost families extra to have a secondary earner in the 
household.  However, as in Malaysia and the United Kingdom, Ireland began to 
recognize the importance of secondary earners, usually married women, in the labor 
force.  “To improve secondary earners’ incentives to enter work, Ireland is switching 
gradually from a joint to an individual assessment of married couple income.”157  
¶54 In 1993, Ireland expanded the filing status options for married couples.158  Ireland 
allocated a special filing for married couples who wanted their income to be assessed 
separately.  This designation is called separate assessment.159  In 1993, Ireland “moved 
from joint filing in the name of the husband with an option for separate assessment on 
                                                 
153 Under Section 2 of the Republic Act of 1948, Ireland acquired complete independence from the United 
Kingdom.  The Republic of Ireland Act, 1948 (Act No. 22/1978), § 2 (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1948/en/act/pub/0022/sec0002.html#zza22y1948s2.  The Irish tax statutes at 
this time referenced British income tax laws and how the statutes amended the British laws.  See 
14/04/1923: Double Taxation (Relief) 1923, Order No. 1, sched. Part I, (a) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1923/en/si/v10pg829.html (“Relief shall be allowed from British Income 
Tax in accordance with and under the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Finance Act, 1920, subject 
to the proviso that for the purpose of determining the Dominion rate of tax.”). 
154 See supra note 127.   
155 See Income Tax Act, 1967, Part IX, c. 1, § 192 (1) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1967/en/act/pub/0006/sec0192.html#zza6y1967s192 (“[A] woman’s income 
chargeable to tax shall, so far as it is income for a year of assessment or part of a year of assessment during 
which she is a married woman living with her husband, be deemed for income tax (including sur-tax) 
purposes to be his income and not to be her income.”).   
156 See Isabelle Joumard, Tax Systems in European Union Countries, 34 OECD ECON. STUD. 91, 98–104 
(2001), available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~dbackus/Taxes/OECD%20EU%20tax%20systems%2002.pdf. 
157 Id. at 101.   
158 Finance Act, 1993, (Act No. 13/1993), c. III, § 10(1) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1993/en/act/pub/0013/sec0010.html#zza13y1993s10:   
(2) Subsection (3) shall apply for a year of assessment where, in the case of a husband and wife 
who are living together— 
(a) (i) an election (including an election deemed to have been duly made) by the husband and wife 
to be assessed to tax in accordance with the provisions of section 194 has effect in relation to that 
year of assessment, and 
(ii) the husband and the wife by notice in writing jointly given to the inspector before the 6th day 
of July in that year of assessment elect that the wife should be assessed to tax in accordance with 
the provisions of section 194 . . . . 
159 Janet G. Stotsky, How Tax Systems Treat Men and Women Differently, 34 FIN. & DEV. 30, 30 (1997), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/03/pdf/stotsky.pdf.  
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labor income for the wife, to an option for the wife to be the ‘primary taxpayer.’”160  
Under separate assessment, each spouse files his or her taxes individually but is still 
treated as married.161  The couple shares equally the following personal tax credits: 
married tax credit, age tax credit, blind person’s tax credit, and incapacitated child tax 
credit.162  The remaining available tax credits, reliefs, and exemptions163 are allocated 
based on the cost incurred by the spouse.164  Furthermore, the “standard rate band up to 
€45,400 can be transferred to the other spouse, but only at the end of the tax year.”165  
Therefore, €45,400 (approximately $61,988)166 of the couple’s income is taxed in the 
lower tax bracket or band of 20%, if only one spouse works.  If both spouses work, up to 
€72,800 (approximately $99,399) can be taxed in the lower tax bracket of 20%.167  
Spouses can choose to be separately assessed by making the election orally or in 
writing.168  
                                                 
160 Id. 
161 In Ireland, the income tax schedules are based on whether an individual is married.  The income tax 
schedule for married couples focuses on whether both spouses work or not.  Irish Tax and Customs, IT2 –
Taxation of Married Couples, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 
22, 2009).   
 The standard rate band for married couples for 2009 is €45,400 subject to an increase of up to €27,400 
when both spouses are working.  The increase is limited to the lower of €27,400 or the amount of the 
income of the spouse with the smaller income.  This increase is not transferable between spouses. 
 In other words, if both spouses are working, up to €72,800 (45,400 + 27,400) can be taxed at the lower 
tax rate of 20%.  However, the €27,400 is limited to lower of €27,400 or the income of the lower earning 
spouse.  Id.  The following table portrays the income tax rate schedule for married couples in the Euro (€), 
Ireland’s currency.  See Finance (No. 2) Act, 2008, c. 3, § 4, Tbl., Part 3 (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2008/en/act/pub/0025/sec0004.html#sec4. 
 
2009 Income Tax Schedule for Married 
Couples:  One Spouse Works 
2009 Income Tax Schedule for Married Couples: 
Both Spouses Work
Rate Income Band (€) Rate Income Band (€) 
20% 0 – 45,400 20% 0 – 72,800* 
41% Balance over 45,400 41% Balance over 72,800
  *27,400 of the 72,800 is limited to the lower of 27,400 or the income of the lower earning spouse.  
  
162 A married person’s taxed credit is allowed in the first year of marriage.  After the first year of marriage, 
the couple must choose whether they want to be jointly assessed, separately assessed, or singly assessed.  
See Irish Tax and Customs, Married Persons Taxation, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/married-
persons-taxation.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  
163 The remaining tax credits, reliefs, and exemptions include dependent relative credit, health expenses 
credit, guide dog allowance, rent credit, artist’s relief, loan interest relief, etc.  See Irish Tax and Customs, 
Tax Credits, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/index.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009); Irish Tax and 
Customs, Reliefs and Exemptions, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/reliefs/index.html (last visited Sept. 22, 
2009).  
164 Irish Tax and Customs, Married Persons Taxation, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/married-
persons-taxation.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
165 Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples, 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  See also supra 
note 161. 
166 Income is in Euros (€), Ireland’s currency, with approximate US dollar equivalent as of March 21, 2009.  
See MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/detail/stock_quote?Symbol=/MYRUS (last visited Sept. 
22, 2009). 
167 See supra note 161.  The additional €27,400 rate band allowed to be taxed at the lower income tax rate 
of 20% is not transferable under separate assessment.   
168 Id.  
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¶55 Due to the enactment of separate assessment in Ireland, married couples presently 
can choose from three forms of filing: single assessment (each spouse is treated and taxed 
as a single individual), joint assessment (spouses income are combined and tax is 
assessed in one spouse’s name), and separate assessment (each spouse’s taxes are 
independent of the other spouse’s).169  Under single assessment, the married person is 
treated as a single individual and taxed at the single rates.170  Additionally, “[o]ne spouse 
cannot claim relief for payments made by the other and there is no right to transfer tax 
credits or standard rate band to each other.”171   
¶56 When assessing the income jointly, a couple decides which spouse’s name to use 
for the assessment of both incomes.172  If a couple does not nominate a spouse, the spouse 
with the highest amount of income in the previous year is deemed the assessed spouse.173  
A couple can transfer credits and the standard rate band or bracket to suit their 
circumstances.174  Unlike joint filing in the IRC, there is no stacking of income, because 
the spouses can use the lower income tax rate on both incomes.   
¶57 As stated previously, separate assessment allows a couple to have their taxes 
computed individually with access to available credits and the standard tax band.175  If no 
choice is made as to how a couple wants to be assessed, joint assessment is automatically 
enforced.176  The filings are illustrated in the next section.   
¶58 Although Ireland’s separate assessment benefits married women, critics argue that 
Ireland’s effective tax rate on secondary earners remains too high.177  Additionally, 
Ireland promotes joint assessment above separate and single assessment.178  However, a 
                                                 
169 Id.  
170 Id.  The following table is in the Euro (€), Ireland’s currency.  See Finance (No. 2) Act 2008, ch. 3, § 4, 
tbl. Part 1 (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2008/en/act/pub/0025/sec0004.html#sec4. 
 
2009 Income Tax Rates for Singles 
Rate Income Band (€)
20% 0 – 36,400*
41% Balance over 36,400
 
171 Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples, 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  The standard rate 
band for married couples for 2009 is €45,400.   
172 Id.  See supra note 161 for the tax schedule for married couples.  
173 Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples, 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
174 Id.  Under Joint Assessment, the tax credits and standard rate band can be allocated between spouses to 
suit their circumstances.  For example: “If only one spouse has taxable income, all tax credits and the 
standard rate band will be given to him or her.”  Id.  “If both spouses have taxable income, they can decide 
which spouse is to be the assessable spouse and request their local Revenue office to allocate the tax credits 
and standard rate band between them in whatever way they wish.  [PAYE tax credit, employment expenses, 
and the basic standard rate band of €27,400 are non transferable.]”  Id. 
175 Id.   
176 Id.   
177 Boris Cournede, Removing Obstacles to Employment for Women in Ireland 7 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, 
Working Paper No. 511, 2006), available at 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2006doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00003C72/$FILE/JT03212998.PDF (“For a Dublin-
based family with two young children where one spouse works and earns the average production wage 
(APW), there is little point for the other spouse to take up a job paid at two-thirds of the APW: the effective 
‘tax plus childcare’ rate is 93%.”)   
178 Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples, 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009) (“Joint Assessment 
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fundamental benefit of Ireland’s separate assessment is that spouses can transfer excess 
allowances and credits in order to lower their overall tax rate.  A couple decides how they 
want to allocate their tax liability.  Most importantly, Ireland’s tax system takes into 
account the working married woman.  As previously stated, Ireland allocates an 
additional amount of income, €27,400 (approximately $37,411), to the lower earning 
spouse or secondary earner, who likely is the married woman,179 and taxes that income at 
the lowest tax rate.  Thus, unlike the United States, in Ireland, the secondary earner’s 
income is not initially taxed at high marginal tax rates.  This is a noteworthy provision 
because it shows that the Irish government recognizes and will not penalize secondary 
earners.   
2. Illustrating Ireland’s Tax Code 
¶59 In this section, three illustrative couples are taxed under each of Ireland’s filing 
options: single assessment, joint assessment, and separate assessment, exclusive of 
applicable tax credits and exemptions and applying the assumption that the couple has 
been married for over a year.180  The average effective tax rate181 is calculated and the 
appropriate income tax schedule is employed.182  The income tax due is the same under 
separate assessment and joint filing, because the spouses are treated as married and taxed 
accordingly.183  The point is to show whether the lower earning spouse, the wife, 
experiences the secondary earner bias.     
¶60 Example One: Consider a couple where only the husband works earning a salary of 
€80,000 (approximately $109,230).184  The taxes due will be €25,156 (approximately 
$34,347) under single assessment, and €23,266 (approximately $31,767) under separate 
and joint assessment.  The additional tax liability under single assessment is not the only 
determinative factor for this couple.  Remember, with single assessment, the couple 
cannot transfer tax credits185 or the lower income tax rate among each other; hence, the 
couple is likely unable to reduce their income tax liability.  Thus, the issue with this 
                                                                                                                                                 
(also known as aggregation) is usually the most favourable basis of assessment for a married couple.”). 
179 See Herwig Immervoll et al., An Evaluation of the Tax-Transfer Treatment of Married Couples in 
European Countries, 33 tbl.1 (Econ. Pol’y Research Unit, Univ. of Copenhagen, Working Paper No. 2008-
03, 2008), available at http://www.econ.ku.dk/eprn_epru/Workings_Papers/wp-08-03.pdf (noting that in 
Ireland, for two-earner couples, of the secondary earners, the spouses that earned less income, seventy-
eight percent were women.). 
180 Note, however, that the calculations would be different if the couple was married in the current tax year.  
See Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples, 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
181 For the formula for average effective tax rate, see supra note 61.  
182 For the income tax rate schedule for singles, see supra note 170.  For the income tax rate schedule for 
married couples, see supra note 161.   
183 Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples, 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  The tax liability 
will be the same because married couples apply the same income tax rate schedule under separate and joint 
assessment.  See supra note 161 for the tax schedule. 
184 Income is in Euros (€), Ireland’s currency, with approximate US dollar equivalent as of March 21, 2009.  
See MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/detail/stock_quote?Symbol=/MYRUS (last visited Sept. 
22, 2009). 
185 For instance, the Home Carer’s Tax Credit is only available if the couple files jointly.  See Irish Tax and 
Customs, Home Carer’s Tax Credit, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/home-carers.html (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2009). 
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couple is not a secondary earner bias issue, but what filing option is best to reduce the 
couple’s taxes.  The next two examples examine when the wife decides to work.  
¶61 Example Two: Now consider a couple in which the wife and husband earn the 
same salary of €40,000 (approximately $54,615), totaling €80,000 (approximately 
$109,230).  Regardless of whether the couple files under single assessment, joint 
assessment, or separate assessment, the total tax due for the couple will be €17,512 
(approximately $23,910).  The issue in this case is how the tax liability is allocated 
among the spouses and what marginal and effective tax rates affect each spouse.  If the 
couple chooses single assessment with no transfer of tax credits and the lower tax rate, 
each will owe taxes of €8756 (approximately $11,955), and each is exposed to a marginal 
income tax of 41% and average effective tax rate of 22%.  However, under joint and 
separate assessment, the couple can decide whose income, if any, will be shielded from 
the high tax rate of 41%.186  Thus, the spouses are able to decide by themselves who will 
incur the higher tax or penalty and what will be their individual effective tax rates.   
¶62 Example Three:  Finally, consider a couple in which the husband earns €60,000 
(approximately $81,022) and wife earns €20,000 ($27,307).  If the couple files under 
single assessment, the total income tax liability is €20,959.  This equals income taxes of 
€16,956 ($23,151), with a portion of income taxed in the higher bracket of 41%, and an 
average effective tax rate of 28% for the husband, and €4000 (approximately $5461), 
with all income taxed in the lower bracket of 20%, and an average effective tax rate of 
20% for the wife.  Under joint and separate assessment, the total income tax liability of 
the couple is €19,066 (approximately $26,032).  However, if the couple decides to file 
under separate assessment, the tax liability of the husband is €15,066 (approximately 
$20,571), with a portion of income taxed at the higher rate of 41%, and an average 
effective tax rate of 25%, and the liability of the wife is €4,000 (approximately $5461), 
with all income taxed at the lower rate of 20%, and an average effective tax rate of 20%.  
Under each filing option, the wife, the secondary earner, is not exposed to high marginal 
taxes and thus, is not penalized for working.       
¶63 These examples show that if a married woman is a secondary earner in Ireland, she 
is not likely to experience the secondary earner bias.  As the spouse with the lower 
earnings, she will be taxed in the lower tax bracket.  This is primarily due to two reasons.  
First, with single assessment, her income is always initially taxed in the lowest tax 
bracket and her marginal income tax is not related to her husband’s income.  Second, 
with joint and separate assessment, although the couple can allocate up to €72,800 taxed 
at the lower tax rate, only €45,400 is transferable between the spouses and the other 
€27,400 is applied towards the income of the lower earning spouse.    
¶64 Problems could arise in implementing Ireland’s income tax filing structure into the 
IRC.  The main concerns would be how the United States’ progressive tax structure 
would adhere to both spouses being able to divide the same credits, and that the income 
tax would not exactly be the same under joint filing and separate assessment.  These 
concerns are addressed below. 
                                                 
186 Since both spouses work, up to €72,800 of their income can be taxed against the lower band or bracket 
of 20%.  The couple’s choices include taxing all of one spouse’s income and €32,800 of the other spouse’s 
income at 20% with the remaining €7,200 taxed at 41% or proportioning the €72,800 under a method they 
create.  
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IV. THE PROPOSAL 
¶65 Married working women should be able to make the choice of entering, re-entering, 
or remaining in the workforce without worrying about whether their income will be lost 
to income taxes.  It is understandable that if both spouses choose to work, their income 
taxes should be greater than that of a family with a sole earner.  However, this must be 
implemented in the IRC in a way that properly recognizes, rather than penalizes, the 
income of secondary earners.  That is what this proposal accomplishes.  This proposal 
integrates the methods that produced tax reform in Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
with the filing structure of Ireland to mitigate or even eliminate the gender discrimination 
effects of the secondary earner bias contained within the IRC.  None of these countries’ 
tax systems are perfect.  Yet, we can still learn from them and apply the parts that are 
commendatory for working married women.   
A. Lessons from Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
¶66 The systems in Malaysia and the United Kingdom teach us that organizing and 
publicly protesting for the removal of the secondary earner bias produces results.  
Consider Malaysia, a country where women’s rights were and continue to be infringed 
upon and, basically, disregarded.  Still, women and organizations were able to influence 
the government to recognize secondary earners in the tax law.187  Recall what occurred in 
the United Kingdom.  The fact that the United Kingdom’s tax code discriminated against 
women as secondary earners was published in a national newspaper and magazine.188  
After reading this, 36,000 readers protested the tax laws and the United Kingdom 
amended them.189   
¶67 This can occur in the United States.  Working married women in the United States 
will continue to be considered secondary earners and penalized for filing both jointly 
with and separately from their husbands until women decide to make a change and have 
their voices heard by the government.  In a society such as Malaysia, where women’s 
rights continue to be limited, women and organizations fought and still fight for removal 
of gender bias in the tax code.  Yet, in the United States, a country whose ideals rest on 
equal rights for all, the discriminatory effects of gender bias remain in the tax code.  
People should organize and protest to have the tax laws changed.   
B. Lessons from Ireland 
¶68 Under this proposal, the IRC will include three filing choices for married couples:  
married filing separately, married filing jointly, and separate assessment.  This is similar 
to Ireland’s tax structure for married couples.  The married filing separately and the 
married filing jointly IRC language, procedures, and tax rates will remain the same as 
they currently are in the IRC.  For the inclusion of the separate assessment, the language 
of Section 1(d)190 of the IRC should be amended.  The language should be changed to: 
                                                 
187 WOMEN’S AID ORG., supra note 110.   
188 Briggs, supra note 137.   
189 Id.   
190 By including the separate assessment designation, the remaining subsections in I.R.C. §1 will move 
down a letter.  Thus, “married individuals filing separate returns” will now be I.R.C. §1(e).  See  I.R.C. 
§1(d) (2006).   
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(d) (1) Married individuals filing under separate assessment.  There is 
hereby imposed on the taxable income of every married individual (as 
defined in section 7703 [26 U.S.C.S. § 7703]) who does not make a single 
return jointly with his or her spouse under section 6013 [26 U.S.C.S. § 
6013], a tax determined in accordance with the following table.191 
If the taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $16,700 10% of taxable income 
Over $16,700 but not over 
$67,900 
$1670, plus 15% of the excess over 
$16,700 
Over $67,900 but not over 
$137,050 
$9350, plus 25% of the excess over 
$67,900 
Over $137,050 but not over 
$208,850 
$26,637.50, plus 28% of the excess 
over $137,050 
Over $208,850 but not over 
$372,950 
$46,741.50, plus 33% of the excess 
over $208,850 
Over $372,950 $100,894.50, plus 35% of the excess 
over $372,950   
 
For use of this filing designation, the married individuals must not earn the 
same amount of income for the taxable year and one spouse’s earnings 
must be at least $40,000 greater than the other spouse’s earnings.192  
  
Married couples who choose to be separately assessed in the United States will be 
individually taxed under the same tax rate schedule as if they filed jointly.   
¶69 As practiced in the United Kingdom193 and Ireland,194 a couple can share the credits 
or jointly decide which spouse will use each credit with the restrictions and designated 
phase-outs for each tax credit applied to each spouse as if the spouse filed as single.  
Specifically, couples can share the Hope and Lifetime Educational Credits, Child and 
Dependent Care Credit, Adoption Credit, and Elderly and Disabled Credit, if applicable.  
If a husband and wife cannot jointly decide how the credits should be allocated when 
there is separate assessment filing, then, as is done in Ireland,195 the credit should be 
apportioned by the cost incurred by each spouse related to the particular tax credit.  If 
spouses cannot determine what cost was paid by whom, then there should be a default 
provision that the credit is shared equally.  The default provision should include that a 
spouse must fulfill the requirements for the credit.   
                                                 
191 Note that these are 2009 income tax rates for couples filing jointly.  
192 The IRC provisions for married filing separately should be moved to from I.R.C. § 1(d) to I.R.C. § 
1(d)(2).   
193 Each spouse in the United Kingdom is entitled to his or her share of a number of allowances, including 
the Personal Allowance, Married Couple’s Allowance, and the Blind Person’s Allowance.  See HM 
Revenue & Customs, Introduction to tax allowances and reliefs, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/intro-
tax-allow.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  See also supra note 141.   
194 See Irish Tax and Customs, Married Persons Taxation, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/married-
persons-taxation.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).   
195 Id.   
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¶70 However, unlike Ireland’s tax system,196 there will not be a set amount of income 
taxed at the lowest income tax rate that can be transferred among spouses.  Instead, under 
separate assessment, each spouse is taxed progressively accordingly to the income levels 
in each tax bracket.  Furthermore, a married couple would not be able to file under 
separate assessment unless both spouses work and one spouse earns at least $40,000 more 
than the other spouse.  This proposal is illustrated in the next section.   
C. Illustrations of the Proposal 
¶71 In this section the same explicative couples referenced in the previous sections are 
employed.  Remember, under each scenario, the couple will owe income taxes of $12,375 
if they file jointly.197   
¶72 Example One: Recall the couple where only the husband worked, earning $80,000.  
The couple would not be able to file under separate assessment because both spouses do 
not work.  The purpose of the separate assessment designation is to assist secondary 
earners.  If the wife is not working, she and her husband should not be able to benefit 
from separate assessment.  However, it is important to note that if the wife decided to 
work, the couple should think about filing under separate assessment instead of filing 
jointly if the wife earns at least $40,000 less than her husband.  This is because under 
separate assessment, the wife’s income would be initially taxed at 10% and not at the 
higher 25% marginal tax rate if they filed jointly.   
¶73 Example Two: Now recall the couple in which both spouses work, earning $40,000 
each.  If they filed under separate assessment, each would owe income taxes of $5165, 
totaling $10,330, which is $2045 less than filing jointly.  As stated above, the separate 
assessment designation is supposed to help lessen the tax burden on secondary earners.  
There is no clear secondary earner in this family, because both spouses earn the same 
income.  Thus, this couple should not be able to take advantage of the IRC, by filing 
under separate assessment instead of jointly, to lessen their income taxes when neither 
spouse is facing a tax penalty.   
¶74 Example Three: Finally, recall the couple in which the husband earns $60,000, 
substantially more than his wife, who earns $20,000.  Since the husband earns $40,000 
more than his wife, they can file under separate assessment.  Their individual income tax 
liability would be $8165 for the husband and $2165 for the wife, totaling $10,330.  This 
is $2045 less than filing jointly.  Instead of a 25% marginal income tax and 15% average 
effective tax rate, under separate assessment, the wife’s marginal income tax rate, as a 
secondary earner, is 15% and the average effective tax rate is 11%.  This example 
perfectly illustrates the importance of the separate assessment designation.  The 
secondary earner is not penalized with high marginal income taxes for working.       
¶75 As these examples indicate, the proposal assists couples who both work, but where 
one spouse earns at least $40,000 more than the other spouse.  Under this proposal, 
couples in such a predicament will owe less income tax by filing under separate 
assessment instead of joint filing primarily because the secondary earner, likely the wife, 
will not be exposed to the high marginal income taxes she would face under joint filing.   
                                                 
196 See Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples, 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).  
197 See supra note 59.  These examples exclude applicable deductions, exemptions, and credits to simplify 
the focus on how the secondary earner bias arises.   
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D. This Proposal can be Applied to the IRC 
¶76 Potential critics of this proposal might argue that the proposal goes too far for 
secondary earners.  If couples are not required to pay the extra penalty for not filing 
jointly, tax revenues may drop.  The status of the current economy could support the 
argument that the United States cannot afford to pay for the rate deduction.  Additionally, 
critics might argue that married couples should just file jointly instead of under separate 
assessment because they would be receiving the benefits of filing jointly (i.e., the tax 
credits).  Some might even argue that having married couples think of themselves as 
individuals could incite the deterioration of the family as a unit.  Consequently, divorce 
rates could increase.   
¶77 What these potential arguments do not take into account is the fact that giving 
people more and better choices as to how they want their income taxed is essential for the 
betterment of families and the United States as a whole.  Under this proposal, married 
couples, particularly married women, will be able to decide whether the wife should work 
or not and if she does work, which filing option is best for them without interference by 
the government.  Studies indicate that in countries that offer the choice of joint filing and 
independent filing or separate assessment, “better-off, two-earner couples can opt for the 
advantages of independent taxation (such as privacy and autonomy in financial affairs) 
[separate assessment], and lower income one-earner couples can benefit from the 
advantages of income pooling [joint filing].”198  Thus, couples, together, can choose 
which option is financially best for their families.199 
¶78 Furthermore, lowering taxes offers an unambiguous incentive to work in the 
market, which in turn creates greater amounts of income to taxation.  “Economic theory 
suggests that reductions in marginal personal income tax rates would increase 
participation in the labor force.  The marginal rate cuts would, in turn, benefit the 
economy by strengthening the incentives to work and save.”200  One of the primary 
reasons behind the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which drastically decreased marginal 
income tax rates, was the Reagan administration’s proposition that lowering taxes would 
actually increase revenue.   Upon signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, President Reagan 
stated: 
When I sign this bill into law, America will have the lowest marginal tax 
rates and the most modern tax code among major industrialized nations, 
one that encourages risk-taking, innovation, and that old American spirit 
of enterprise.  We'll be refueling the American growth economy with the 
kind of incentives that helped create record new businesses and nearly 
11.7 million jobs in just 46 months.  Fair and simpler for most Americans, 
this is a tax code designed to take us into a future of technological 
                                                 
198 O’Donoghue & Sutherland, supra note 93, at 6.   
199 Id.   
200 WILLIAM W. BEACH, ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., APPENDIX: THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL EFFECTS 
OF THE PRESIDENT'S GROWTH PACKAGE 20 (2003), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/budget/cda0305a.cfm.  
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invention and economic achievement, one that will keep America 
competitive and growing into the 21st century.201 
¶79 President Bush’s tax cuts on income, capital gains, and dividends in 2003 produced 
a $785 billion increase in revenue over four years.202  In fact, by lowering taxes, the 
percentage of taxes paid by the wealthy increased between 1980 and 2005.203 
¶80 Moreover, although this proposal draws on international examples, the idea of 
individual filing for married couples is not altogether foreign to the debate in the United 
States.204  Specifically, Lawrence Zelenak proposed individual filing in 1994 under the 
assertion that the IRC should abolish the requirement that married couples identify 
themselves as married when filing their return.205  Instead, each spouse is treated as an 
individual and taxed accordingly, and therefore, by taxing the spouses individually, the 
secondary earner bias is eliminated and the spouse that actually earned and controlled the 
income is taxed for it.206  Zelenak proclaimed that individual filing would alleviate the 
secondary bias, because under a progressive tax system with joint filing for married 
couples, the secondary earner is inevitably penalized.207  This proposal recognizes 
Zelenak’s notion but clarifies which married couples can employ the separate assessment 
designation and at what rates they will be taxed.  As stated above, under the proposal, 
only married couples in which both spouses work and one spouse earns at least $40,000 
more than the other spouse can file separate assessment, where they are taxed at the 
married filing jointly rates.  Additionally, the proposal does not abolish joint filing or 
married filing separately designations.   
¶81 It must be noted that there would be no need for this proposal if secondary earners, 
who in most instances are women, were not penalized for working by the IRC.  It is 
extremely important for families to be able to make their own decisions as to whether 
both spouses will work.  Couples making decisions together and thinking about what is 
best for their families without interference by the government should strengthen families 
not fragment them.  Overall, this proposal does what Congress has not done: It recognizes 
                                                 
201 Remarks before Signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 551 (Oct. 22, 1986), available at 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagantaxreformactof1986.html.  
202 Pete Du Pont, Inconvenient Tax Truths: Charlie Rangel and Other Liberal Leaders Want to Raise Tax 
Rates Even if it Means Lower Tax Revenues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007, 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110010798.  For President Bush’s tax cuts, see 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 38 (2001); Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 108th Cong., 117 Stat. 752 (2003). 
203 Du Pont, supra note 202 (“According to the Treasury Department, the top 1% of income tax filers paid 
just 19% of income taxes in 1980 (when the top tax rate was 70%), and 36% in 2003, the year the Bush tax 
cuts took effect (when the top rate became 35%).  The top 5% of income taxpayers went from 37% of taxes 
paid to 56%, and the top 10% from 49% to 68% of taxes paid.  And the amount of taxes paid by those 
earning more than $1 million a year rose to $236 billion in 2005 from $132 billion in 2003, a 78% 
increase.”). 
204 See Alstott, supra note 47, at 2022–31; Bittker, supra note 11, at 1437–42; MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 
5, 65, 68–69.   
205 Zelenak, supra note 24, at 342–44 (“The only way to avoid both marriage bonuses and penalties is to 
abandon marital status as a tax determinant and to require that spouses file separate returns. . . . Mandatory 
separate returns . . . can be persuasively defended as reflecting governmental neutrality between traditional 
families and two-earner couples.”).   
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 339–40.   
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the importance of secondary earners and the need to not penalize them with high 
marginal income taxes.  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶82 Most people would agree that working women are necessary contributors to the 
U.S. economy.  Yet, the tax laws do not reflect these notions.  The tax laws are outdated 
and should be amended.  Indeed, Congress has enacted some provisions that do favor 
working women.208  However, this is not enough.  By learning from the tax reforms in 
Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, Congress could move forward in allowing 
working married women in the United States to make choices about whether they want to 
work or not without being penalized by the tax code if they do decide to work.     
¶83 If the Malaysian and the United Kingdom experiences are any indication, then it is 
most likely that the secondary earner bias will not be adequately addressed until 
protestors, particularly voters, make it known to Congress that women should not be 
explicitly or implicitly discriminated against by the tax code.  What is very disturbing is 
that it has taken so much time to bring to Congress’s attention the fact that many working 
married women are unfairly treated by the tax code.  In a country where every citizen is 
supposed to be treated fairly and equally, it would seem that a discriminatory effect, such 
as the secondary earner bias, would have not remained in force for such a long period of 
time.   
¶84 This proposal presents a considered method for lessening the discriminatory effects 
of the IRC on working married women who earn less than their husbands.  The creation 
of the separate assessment designation allows most working married women to not be 
taxed more than they would have been taxed if they had been joint filers.  Such a 
designation prevents these women from becoming victims of the secondary earner bias 
and its associated higher marginal income tax rate.   Additionally, under separate 
assessment, working married women may still access the same applicable tax credits 
available had they filed jointly with their husbands.  Most importantly, with the separate 
assessment filing designation, married women will be able to make their own choices: 
whether they want to begin working or resume a career, and how they want their income 
to be assessed without interference or influence by the government.  They will be able to 
make these decisions unburdened by the secondary bias presently lurking in the tax code. 
                                                 
208 For instance, the “head-of-household” filing designation may result in a better tax position for women if 
the taxpaying woman is a single mother.  However, the child care credit, head of household status, earned 
income tax credit, and dependant care credit all generally improve women’s tax positions less than they 
improve men’s.  See, e.g., Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax in TAXING AMERICA 25 (Karen B. Brown & Mary 
Louise Fellows eds. 1996); Alstott, supra note 47, at 2038–39, 2056–60; Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the 
Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 63–
91 (1971); Staudt, supra note 79, at 1571, 1601–05, 1609.  
